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Upon the oral argument as well as in its printed
brief plaintiff took the position that the copper solution
was plaintiff's property while in the dump and so continued until plaintiff had abandoned it, that the institution of this suit by plaintiff was for the purpose of
1
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preserving this solution and preventing its running to
waste, or, which is the same thing, passing into the
hands of strangers. It was plaintiff's position that this
court's determination of title to the solutions while in
the dump would conclude the controversy.

Defendants'

contention was, that whether or not title to the solutions
while in the dump was in plaintiff was of no consequence because the moment the solutions reached the
surface beneath the dump—and there they must of
necessity ultimately arrive—title would vest in the defendants no matter where it had been prior to that time.
Defendants, however,

directed a substantial p a r t of

their argument to the easement or grant to the plaintiff, choosing to treat the plaintiff as to these meteoric
waters and solutions somewhat a trespasser, from which
status the plaintiff could acquire no interest or title to
the meteoric waters accumulated

within the dump.

They argued that the grant to plaintiff was so limited
in its scope that while plaintiff must permit the rain
and snow to fall upon the dump, seep into and percolate
through it, yet plaintiff had acquired no right to take,
remove or appropriate the valuable solutions after they
had reached the surface beneath.

Nature's

action

being, as they contended, beyond the grant, not only
these worthless meteoric waters belonged to the defendants but the valuable mineral content, admittedly the
property of plaintiff, picked up by those waters as
they passed

through the

dump, became defendants'

property upon its reaching the surface beneath, a sit2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nation that plaintiff was powerless to avoid because of
a claimed natural right in the defendants as owners of
the fee to have these meteoric waters come to their
surface.

It is not our intention now to re-argue this

case and we of necessity conclude from a number of
expressions in the opinion of this court that it has
finally disposed of that issue, is clearly of the opinion
and has decided that ' i the waters containing copper or
other minerals in solution so long as they are in the
dump and

thus a

part of it

*

* * are like the

dump itself, the property of the plaintiff.''

But to that

portion of the petition and argument that is a criticism
of the opinion as uncertain in expression, ambiguous
and calculated to provoke disputes as to the meaning
thereof and the purport intended, we direct this reply.
For ready reference we set out the portion of the
opinion with which we are here concerned, as follows:
" * * * The plaintiff thus commenced
this action to condemn a right of way and easements over the defendant's claims, the surface of
which had not theretofore been conveyed to the
plaintiff, to excavate a tunnel and lay a pipe line
on the surface of the defendant's claim or claims
to collect and divert the waters in the dump so
carrying copper and other minerals in solution
and to convey them to tanks of its own where
the copper and other minerals may be precipitated
and saved for its own use and benefit.
" I t is not contended that the plaintiff, under
the statute, was not entitled to exercise the right
3
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of eminent domain, provided the waters carrying
copper in solution and by the plaintiff sought to
be collected and diverted belonged to it. * * *
Confessedly, the determination of the case depends largely upon the question of whether the
waters carrying copper in solution, so long as
they are still in the dump, are the property of the
plaintiff or of the defendant. It may be conceded
that the waters, though they carry copper in solution picked up from the dump as they seep
through it, after they were suffered and permitted
to flow out of the dump and seep and percolate
through soil and earth on the claim or claims of
the defendant, not conveyed to the plaintiff became
a part of such soil and earth and the property of
the defendant, and thus lost to the plaintiff. But
how does the matter stand so long as the waters
seeping and percolating through the dump are
still in the dump and a part of it? * * * It is
conceded that the dump or deposit itself is personal property and is the property of the plaintiff with the right at any time to remove it or
any part thereof.
That the dump contains copper of commercial value is not disputed. The
gulch in which the dump is deposited is on the
side of a mountain and is of funnel shape with
the toe at the bottom or lower end of the dump
and gulch. As described, it represents a somewhat inclined hopper in which material was deposited first on the lower and narrow part of
it and then on higher levels along the upper portion of it. As the rain and snow fell on the dump
the waters, as they seeped through it, picked up
copper and other minerals in solution * * #
What the plaintiff proposes to do is to construct
a tunnel through the fill and on the surface of
the defendant's claim * * * and extend two
open trenches about five or six feet long at right
angles to the face of its tunnel, and by such
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means gather and collect the waters in and at the
bottom of the dump and convey them by a pipe
line to its precipitating tanks below. * * * I t
is not contemplated by the plaintiff to take
waters not in the dump, and, as made to appear,
the proposed plan will not collect or take any
other waters. It also is made to appear without
any substantial conflict that before the material
was deposited in the dump all waters flowing from
the gulch were waters from freshets or high
waters and that at greater portions of the year
there was no water flowing from the gulch, and
what waters did flow from it contained no minerals and partially were used by others for culinary and domestic purposes. And it also is made
to appear that the waters which, at the time of
the commencement of this action, were collected
and conveyed by the defendant, were waters coming directly from the dump carrying copper in
solution picked up as the waters seeped and passed
through the dump.
" T h u s , under the circumstances, we are of
the opinion that the waters carrying copper or
other minerals in solution, so long as they are in
the dump and thus a part of it, and before they
leave it and percolate through the soil and earth
on the claim or claims of the defendant not conveyed to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself,
the property of the plaintiff; that it is as lawful
for the plaintiff, so long as the waters are in the
dump, to collect and remove them as it is to remove the dump itself; and that the grant which
gave the plaintiff the right at any time to remove
the dump or any part thereof also gave it the
right to remove the waters carrying copper or
other minerals of commercial value in solution.
" * * * the defendant makes no claim to
any of the ore or other material deposited on the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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dump; and since the copper in solution is from
the dump and from the ore and material deposited
thereon and therein and not otherwise, it would
seem that the defendant has no better claim to
the mineral in solution, so long as it is in the
dump, than to the ore or other material in the
dump.
" # * * the rain and snow falling on the
dump did not fall on the surface of the defendant's ground. The surface of that ground and
upon which the dump rests was conveyed to the
plaintiff.
True, it was conveyed for dumping
purposes, but so long as the surface is occupied
by the dump, it, as surface ground, is not susceptible of any other use; and waters falling on and
flowing or seeping through the dump, so long as
they are in the dump, do not fall on or seep or
percolate through soil of the defendant or on or
through any surface right owned by it but on a
surface right and material, ore, rock, and earth
owned by the plaintiff. * * *
" * * * n o waters percolating through
the soil of the defendant are here involved and
are not sought or attempted to be taken b}^ the
plaintiff. What it proposes to do is to collect
and take the waters carrying copper in solution
while yet in the dump and before they reach the
soil or ground of the defendant. Were the plaintiff attempting to follow, collect, and divert waters, though they carry copper in solution, after
they have left the dump and percolating in and
through the soil and ground of the defendant not
conveyed to the plaintiff, the cited cases would be
applicable, but that is not what the plaintiff seeks
to do. It may readily be conceded that waters,
though they carry copper or other minerals in
solution, which are suffered and permitted to
flow and escape from the dump and seep and per,6 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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colate through the soil and earth of the defendant's claims not conveyed to the plaintiff and on
or in which it has no surface or other rights, are
lost to the plaintiff and become the propery of
the defendant and may not be pursued or reclaimed or taken by the plaintiff.
" * * * do the waters carrying copper
in solution, as long as they are and remain in the
dump and before they leave it and
percolate
through the soil and ground of the defendant not
conveyed to the plaintiff, belong to the plaintiff
or to the defendant? We have no hesitancy in
answering that question in favor of the plaintiff.
" * * * counsel for defendant * * *
offered to prove that the gulch, where it connected
with the main canyon was narrow and steep, but
as it extended up the side of the mountain it widened out and was less steep; that from the
excavations made since the order of immediate
possession it appeared that the soil on the side
and the bottom of the gulch on the defendant's
property and under the dump was from eight to
thirty feet deep; that the waters resulting from
rain and snow then and in the past percolated
through such soil as they reached the bottom of
the gulch; that such soil prior to the deposits
retarded the waters falling from the rain and
snow and that the dump further retarded them
as they fell on and seeped through the dump; that
in the defendant's mining operations a tunnel,
excavated on and in its claim or claims, intercepted and gathered the waters below the actual
surface soil which waters had been intercepted
and diverted by a pipe line of the defendant,' and
that such tunnel waters are a part of the waters
used by the defendant in precipitating therefrom
the copper content taken into solution from the

7
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surface dump and in copper rock in place; and
that 'The effect of the proposed tunnel and diverting works and pipe line of the plaintiff, if the
same were constructed, will be to necessarily
divert and impound and take away from the defendant the tunnel waters aforesaid.'
a

#

#

#

" * # * We are of the opinion that portions of the offered testimony were material,
especially that part of the offer where it was
offered to prove that among the waters collected
and diverted by the defendant by means of its
tunnel were waters seeping and percolating
through the soil and collecting copper in solution
from rock in place on the defendant's claims and
that the proposed tunnel, diverting works, and
pipe line of the plaintiff would divert, impound,
and take such waters from the defendant's tunnel. However, since the judgment does not give
the plaintiff any such waters, we think the ruling
harmless. We have already indicated that the
plaintiff is entitled to collect, divert, and take the
waters carrying copper and other minerals in
solution as long as such waters are in and a p a r t
of the dump, but that the plaintiff is not entitled
to pursue and reclaim or take such or any waters
after they have left the dump and seep and percolate through the soil or earth on the defendant's
claim or claims not conveyed to the plaintiff. Of
course, as is seen, the plaintiff, by its proposed
plan of collecting and diverting the waters in the
dump, to a large extent at least, will deprive the
defendant of such waters; but the plaintiff has
the undoubted right to do that.
It is not required to suffer or permit such waters in the
dump ladened with copper or other minerals in
solution to flow out and seep and percolate in and
through the soil of the defendant's claim or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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claims not conveyed to the plaintiff for the defendant's use and benefit. The defendant has an interest in and to such waters only after they are
suffered and permitted to flow and leave the dump
and percolate through the soil and earth and become a part of its ground not conveyed to the
plaintiff. If the plaintiff in collecting and diverting waters shall take waters which are not in the
dump or a p a r t of it, but are seeping and percolating through the earth and soil of the defendant's
ground not conveyed to the plaintiff, the defendant is not without remedy and by this action is not
precluded from asserting its right to such waters.
''The findings and the judgment of the court
are in harmony with these views, except in one
of the conclusions stated by the court wherein the
court stated a conclusion that ' although such
water and solutions in said dump or deposit should
percolate through the natural surface soil beneath
said dump and upon the mining claims of the
defendants before plaintiff should have collected,
conserved, or diverted the same, plaintiff would
not be thereby divested of said title, but on the
contrary plaintiff would continue throughout such
percolation until, upon and subsequent to plaintiff's collection and diversion of said waters and
solutions, the absolute owner thereof, with the
untrammeled right in plaintiff to dispose of said
waters and solutions as plaintiff's advantage
might dictate.' Such a statement would imply
that the plaintiff has the right to follow the
waters after they leave the dump and seep and
percolate through the soil and earth on the defenda n t s ' ground or claims not conveyed to the plaintiff. But not anything of that kind is contained
in the findings or in the judgment. The findings
and the judgment give the plaintiff the right to
take the waters carrying copper or other min9
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erals in solution only so long as they are in the
dump and a part of it and give the plaintiff no
right to pursue waters seeping and percolating
through the soil and earth on the defendant's
ground not conveyed to the plaintiff. We therefore think that the ruling refusing the defendant's offer was harmless. However, since conclusions may to some extent be considered as amplifying or reflecting findings and a judgment,
that portion of the conclusions just referred to
is disapproved and ordered stricken and the
district court directed to recast its conclusions in
such respect, and if there be any such or similar
provisions either in the findings or in the judgment which have escaped our attention, to likewise in such respect recast those. In all other
particulars the findings are approved and the
judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent."
(Italics ours).
It is said in that opinion that " t h e surface of that
ground and upon which the dump rests was conveyed
to the plaintiff."

And in the course of the opinion

this court defines the balance of defendants' property
as that " n o t conveyed to the plaintiff".

This definition

so phrased occurs no less than eleven times in this
opinion and cannot be said to have been an inadvertence.

This opinion

otherwise than

cannot be reasonably construed

as holding

that

the grant

by

the

defendants' predecessors to plaintiff was a conveyance of
the surface upon which the dump rests for the

purposes

stated in the grant " a n d that the grant which gave to
plaintiff the right at any time to remove the dump or any
part thereof

also gave it the right to remove the

10 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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waters carrying copper or other minerals of commercial
value in solution".

Whether this grant be denominated

a conveyance of the fee in the surface or an easement
for these purposes is of very little importance.

If an

easement merely, that easement is imposed upon the
fee, and the purport of the decision is that plaintiff by
that grant acquired the right at any time to remove
the mineral solutions from the dump by any reasonable
or practical method, using therein the fee upon which
this easement was imposed for that purpose.

There is

only one method possible whereby these solutions may
be removed, and that is the method plaintiff has adopted.

It is perfectly obvious that the solutions cannot

be removed from the dump before they reach the surface beneath, but the right to use that surface "upon
which the dump r e s t s " as a collecting medium and
conduit this court has clearly held within the terms of
the grant or easement.

It is difficult to express that

thought more clearly than this court has itself done.
J u s t note the following:
" I t is not contemplated by the plaintiff to
take waters not in the dump, and, as made to
appear, the proposed plan will not collect or take
any other waters. * # * And it also is made
to appear that the waters which, at the time of
the commencement of this action, were collected
and conveyed by the defendant, were waters coming directly from the dump carrying copper in
solution picked up as the waters seeped and
passed through the dump.
" T h u s , under the circumstances, we are of
11Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the opinion that the waters carrying copper or
other minerals in solution, so long as they are
in the dump and thus a p a r t of it, and before
they leave it and percolate through the soil and
earth on the claim or claims of the defendant not
conveyed to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself, the property of the plaintiff; that it is as
lawful for the plaintiff, so long as the waters are
in the dump, to collect and remove them as it is
to remove the dump itself; and that the grant
which gave the plaintiff the right at any time to
remove the dump or any part thereof also gave it
the right to remove the waters carrying copper
or other minerals of commercial value in solution.
$k

$k

$k

$k

dfc

*;

A';

;W;

" * * # It may readily be conceded that
waters, though they carry copper or other minerals in solution, which are! suffered and permitted
to flow and escape from the dump and seep and
percolate through the soil and earth of the defendant's claims not conveyed to the plaintiff and
on or in which it has no surface or other rights,
are lost to the plaintiff and become the property
of the defendant and may not be pursued or reclaimed or taken by the plaintiff.
"
* * * do the waters carrying copper
in solution, as long as they are and remain in
the dump and before they leave it and percolate
through the soil and ground of the defendant not
conveyed to the plaintiff, belong to the plaintiff
or to the defendant! We have no hesitancy in
answering that question in favor of the plaintiff.

" * * * Of course, as is seen, the plaintiff, by its proposed plan of collecting and diverting the waters in the dump, to a large extent at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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least, will deprive the defendant of such waters;
but the plaintiff has the undoubted right to do
that. It is not required to suffer or permit such
waters in the dump ladened with copper or other
minerals in solution to flow out and seep and percolate in and through the soil of the defendant's
claim or claims not conveyed to the plaintiff for
the defendant's use and benefit. The defendant
has an interest in and to such waters only after
they are suffered and permitted to flow and leave
the dump and percolate through the soil and earth
and become a part of its ground not conveyed to
the plaintiff. * * * " (Italics ours).
It is said in the petition for rehearing that " t h e
court's opinion assumes that the dump is at bed rock",
which is contrary to the fact because there is soil upon
bed rock. What difference can it make that there be soil
on bed rock beneath the dump?

If there were no soil,

counsel would continue consistent with their theory
that the moment the mineral solutions of the plaintiff
touch bed rock, by some magic plaintiff would be forthwith divested

of

its title

to the solutions and they

would thereupon become the property of defendants.
The

solutions must

be

collected

somewhere before

plaintiff can take them, just as the dump when deposited must have found some place upon this surface
upon which to repose.

Both rights are includued with-

in the grant or easement, as this court so clearly stated
in its opinion.

To say that this court has found title

in plaintiff to the solutions while in the dump up to
but not after they have reached the surface upon which
the dump rests and that title passes immediately to de13
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fendant when those solutions shall have reached such
surface, thereby depriving plaintiff of any way of gaining possession of property pursuant to the provisions
of that grant of which plaintiff is the decreed owner,
while at the same time affirming a judgment in condemnation for the purpose of collecting, diverting and
appropriating that property, is to put an absurd construction upon the opinion of this court and is a statement that indicates defendants' refusal to read the
opinion fairly—none so blind as they who will not see.
Defendants indeed take the Shylock incident seriously.
We have never held a very high regard for it as legal
authority,

although we think

there have been

some

thousands of other occasions when it has been cited by
lawyers suffering from a dearth of legal precedent. Of
course the plaintiff wants nothing but the solutions in
its dump, which this court has decided are its. property
and which plaintiff has the right to remove and keep
as its own, and, of course, the defendants want nothing
but the very same solutions, which this court has decided they do not own and of which they have no right to
deprive the plaintiff.
The petition for rehearing in so far as it is an
attempt to re-argue this case is met squarely by the
decision of this court.

The opinion of this court is

plain and it is not subject to hair-splitting criticism. I t
gives to plaintiff the untrammeled right to remove the
copper-laden waters contained in plaintiff's dump by
14 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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any practical method or means and holds by the method
plaintiff proposes, plaintiff has not encroached upon
the property rights of defendants beyond the scope of
this eminent domain proceeding; that should further
encroachment ever become necessary

plaintiff

may

resort to the eminent domain statutes whereby to secure such rights, just as it has done in the instant case.
We can find nothing in this petition to justify a
reargument of the case.

There is nothing ambiguous

in this opinion and the petition for rehearing should
be denied.
Eespectfully submitted,
DICKSON, E L L I S , PARSONS & ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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